



This study evaluates first- and second-best trading policies for regulating watershed phosphorus
under asymmetric information. The trading policies are differentiated on the degree to which regula-
tors observe point and nonpoint source abatement efforts. The efficiency losses attributable to these
informational asymmetries and those of the second-best policies can be measured in social welfare,
and provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures. Given representative moni-
toring costs from national water monitoring programs, it is shown that under asymmetric information,
the chosen second-best trading policies outperform first-best policies by 11% in the control of water-
shed nutrient pollution.
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That agricultural pollution adversely affects national
water resources to a significant degree is no longer
questioned. In its 1998 report to Congress on the
state of the nation’s water, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) reported that agricultural
pollution contributed to 60% of impaired river areas,
30% of impaired lake areas, 15% of the impaired
estuarine areas, and 15% of the impaired coastal
shoreline assessed (U.S. EPA, 2000).
While the EPA has moved to exert increased
control over pollution generated at larger livestock
and poultry facilities (U.S. EPA, 2001a), there exists
no similar provision under the Clean Water Act
allowing federal control of agricultural pollution
arriving from nonpoint sources (NPSs) such as crop-
land. Reductions in agricultural NPS pollution have
historically been achieved via voluntary conser-
vation programs, typically practice-based, which
pay farmers to adopt “best” management practices
(BMPs) or retire environmentally sensitive cropland
(Ribaudo, Horan, and Smith, 1999).
Modest environmental successes from these pro-
grams have been realized (Ribaudo, Osborn, and
Konyar, 1994; Feather and Hellerstein, 1997; Han-
sen, Feather, and Shank, 1999). Nevertheless, as
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evidenced by more than 37 effluent trading and off-
set programs for NPS water pollution (Environ-
omics, 1999), the promise of performance-based
trading policies to achieve water quality goals at
least cost remains tempting (Heimlich and Claassen,
1998).
The performance and appropriateness of these
policies for NPS pollution, however, continue to be
challenged for a number of reasons—e.g., noncom-
pliance (Malik, 1990), market power (Van Egteren
and Weber, 1996), transactions costs (Stavins, 1995),
uncertainty (Taff and Senjem, 1996), and trading
ratios (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).
This study focuses on one persistent criticism of
performance-based policies for agricultural non-
point sources: informational asymmetries and the
associated problem of moral hazard and noncom-
pliance. Specifically, farmers may misrepresent
abatement efforts when imperfect monitoring
exists, which erodes the cost-effectiveness of such
policies. This possibility has been extensively noted
in the nonpoint source literature (Shortle and Dunn,
1986; Smith and Tomasi, 1999; Moledina, Coggins,
and Polasky, 2002), and many analysts have model-
ed optimal monitoring and enforcement efforts to
address this problem in theory.
These theoretic policy models have generally
fallen into two categories: (a) those that base
monitoring and enforcement on observations of am-
bient environmental quality (e.g., Segerson, 1988;
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Xepapadeas, 1991; Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 1998),
and (b) those that focus monitoring and enforce-
ment on individual firms (e.g., Malik, 1993; Garvie
and Keeler, 1994; Stranlund and Dhanda, 1999).
This analysis follows the latter framework, which
arguably better reflects current regulatory practices.
While much of this literature has addressed non-
stochastic, point source (PS) pollution, three recent
studies are more applicable to agricultural, NPS
trading programs. Malik (1993) examines incentive-
compatible auditing and enforcement by the regu-
lator when firms must self-report abatement compli-
ance. Garvie and Keeler (1994) extend this analysis
to heterogeneous firms which strategically interact
with the regulator. Finally, Stranlund and Dhanda
(1999) explicitly consider noncompliance in dynamic
trading policies under asymmetric information. They
establish, in such a case, that optimal monitoring and
enforcement need not be differentiated across heter-
ogeneous firms as advocated earlier by Malik (1993)
and Garvie and Keeler (1994).
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These theoretical models illustrate how noncom-
pliance and costly monitoring and enforcement can
erode the efficiency of market-based policies to
control pollution. However, the extent of these effi-
ciency losses and how they compare to those under
conventional uniform performance standards or
other second-best policies remains in question.
This study is the first to empirically examine
watershed nutrient trading policies for PS and NPS
pollution and the welfare losses due to asymmetric
information. These losses are examined for a phos-
phorus-impaired watershed in southern Minnesota.
The objective is to evaluate trade-based policies in
the presence of asymmetric information assuming
moral hazard and noncompliance when watershed
sources are required to invest in and report abate-
ment efforts.
In the following section, several watershed trading
programs for point and nonpoint sources are devel-
oped. These programs are based on the extent to
which the regulator can observe abatement efforts
2
and on investments in monitoring. To evaluate these
policies, watershed data are then used to estimate
cost and benefit functions for restricting phosphorus
discharges into area surface waters. Assuming farm-
ers act on the asymmetric information and moral
hazard present, the policies are evaluated based on
realized social welfare (i.e., the net of expected
benefits, compliance costs, and monitoring invest-
ments). The results section establishes that second-
best polices can outperform first-best policies by as
much as 11% given costly monitoring. Both first-
and second-best trading programs are observed to
generally outperform uniform performance standards
by more than 29%. Concluding remarks are pro-
vided in the final section.
Theoretical Model
There are n sources (i = 1, ..., n) that discharge phos-
phorus into a watershed: j point sources (i =1,..., j),
and n!j nonpoint sources (i = j+1,...,n). The reg-
ulator has observed past discharges by sources and
expects aggregate phosphorus discharge in the
absence of regulation (ex ante) to be   for ¯ E ' '
n
i'1¯ ei
expected weather patterns (where overbars represent
expected values). Let total discharges in the pres-
ence of regulation (ex post) be and ag- E ' '
n
i'1ei,
gregate abatement be where abatement A ' '
n
i'1ai,
effort (ai) for source i is the difference between ex-
pected discharge (‘i) and actual discharge (ei).
3
The cost for PSs to abate quantity ai is given as
C(ai) for i = 1, ..., j, where C(ai) maps the cost-min-
imizing choice of abatement effort to achieve the
desired abatement level. For NPSs, abatement is a
function of two parameters: observable abatement
effort (r) and unobservable abatement effort (z). For
this analysis, observable abatement efforts include
crop choice and tillage practice; unobservable efforts
include the rate and method of fertilizer appli-
cations. These efforts can be loosely thought of as
abatement effort on the observable extensive margin
and abatement effort on the unobservable intensive
margin, respectively (Yiridoe and Weersink, 1998).
NPS abatement can then be written as C(ai(ri, zi))
œ i = j + 1, ..., n. These cost functions exhibit the









>0 , œ i ' 1,..., n.
1  As noted above, Van Egteren and Weber (1996) explore trading pro-
grams and noncompliance. However, the main thrust of their paper is the
extent to which market power and noncompliance interact and how permit
endowments may be catered to remedy this issue.
2  Basing permit trades on the degree to which BMPs are directly observ-
able is similar to recent developments in EPA-sponsored offset programs
(Environomics, 1999).
3  The theoretical development and empirical analysis herein are based
on expected values; hence, the uncertain nature of nonpoint sources is
manifest only in the self-reporting of unobservable abatement efforts.
Whether or not nonpoint sources can be treated as uncertain point sources
is often debated in the literature. However, such discussion would not add
to or subtract from the results of this analysis.Johansson Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information   223
This abatement is increasing in abatement effort:
Mai(ri, zi)
Mri











œ i = j + 1, ..., n.
Perfect Information
Because individual costs are convex in abatement,
it must be that aggregate abatement costs for the
watershed are also convex:
MC(A)
MA
>0 a n d M2C(A)
MA2 >0 .
The function B(A) maps the benefits to society of
restricting phosphorus from entering area surface




>0 a n d M2B(A)
MA2 <0 .
With perfect information, the regulator’s problem
(RP
0) is to choose aggregate abatement to maximize
social welfare (SW):





The first-order condition characterizing a solution
to (1) is necessary and sufficient given the assump-







The regulator can achieve optimal abatement, A
*
(where the superscript asterisk represents optimal
levels), by employing a number of regulatory mech-
anisms, generally a price (e.g., Pigouvian tax) or
quantity (e.g., quota or permit) instrument. These
mechanisms have different advantages and disad-
vantages, but under full information either achieves
Pareto optimality (Weitzman, 1974).
In the case of phosphorus discharges and trad-
able permits, the regulator may distribute permits,




Ri ' ¯ E & A*,
where each permit represents the right to discharge
one pound of phosphorus into the river in the year
the permit was issued.
5 Under this trading program,
each source will buy and sell permits (xi) and
choose abatement (ai) to solve the source problem
(SP):
(2) SPi / min
ai,xi
C(ai) & PRxi,
where xi = ‘i ! Ri ! ai, and PR is the equilibrium
permit price. The corresponding necessary and suffi-
cient n + 1 first-order conditions are:









& PR ' 0,







The least-cost solution to (2) is characterized by the
vector of optimal abatement levels, , a* ' a(r*, z*)
such that marginal abatement costs are equalized
across sources.
Asymmetric Information
Suppose the regulator has determined  , A* and a*
given known costs and benefits, but cannot directly
observe the NPS choice vector z. There now exists
the incentive for NPSs to misrepresent abatement
efforts. This noncompliance, if it occurs, will be of
the following form. First, there is no possibility for
PSs to misrepresent abatement efforts or for NPSs
to misrepresent adoption of ri, both of which are
freely observed.
6 However, NPSs can mislead the
regulator by reporting and adopting different levels
of unobservable abatement efforts.
To distinguish between reported abatement efforts
and adopted efforts, let reported values be denoted
by a prime symbol (N), and adopted values be denot-
ed by a double prime (O). Then if NPSs were to fully
exploit the unobservable z (the vector of all pos-
sible unobservable abatement choices), they would
simply report aN = a(0, zN), where zN = max(z), and
would adopt aO = a(0, 0) = 0. However, because the
4  Assume that MB(0)/MA > MC(0)/MA = 0, and that, for A sufficiently
large, MB(A)/MA < MC(0)/MA.
5  This analysis assumes sources receive an endowment of permits pro-
portional to their ex ante emission levels. Alternative distribution
mechanisms will not affect the outcome of the trading market, as perfect
competition is assumed.
6  The term “freely observed” is used to distinguish those practices that
are “easily” observed. While such monitoring would entail some costs, it
is assumed these costs are negligible compared to the costs of monitoring
fertilizer application rates and methods.224   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
regulator knows and be- C(ai(ri, zi)) œi'j%1,...,n,
cause r is observable,
7 the NPSs must report, at the
least, resulting in the abate- aN' a(rN, zN) $ a(r*, z*),
ment vector This notion of strate- aO' a(rN, 0) # a*.
gic noncompliance is dissimilar to that found in
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), but is intuitively
more realistic given the nature of agricultural pro-
duction.
Given this behavioral assumption, the regulator
can do one or more things depending on the extent
to which adopted and reported values diverge. The










where the full range of z is available to NPSs. Let
this most flexible trading program be denoted
ETS-2. The regulator could also restrict z and elim-
inate abatement credits for certain unobservable
abatement choices. Let these trading programs be
denoted ETS-1 and ETS-0, where ETS-1 does not
allow credit for fertilizer application rate changes,
and ETS-0 does not allow credit for fertilizer appli-
cation method or rate changes. The range of trading
programs, m, is then m 0 (0, 1, 2).
In addition to restricting credits for unobservable
practices, the regulator may also invest in monitor-
ing efforts to reveal nonpoint choices of z. Let there
be three levels of monitoring effort, d, which have
different per acre costs, CC(d).
8 The regulator can
choose not to monitor unobservable abatement
practices (d = 0), where CC(0) = 0. The regulator
can purchase monitoring devices which allow mon-
itoring of fertilizer application methods (d = 1). The
regulator may also purchase monitoring devices
which allow monitoring of fertilizer application
methods and rates (d=2), where 0<CC(1)<CC(2).
The range of investment choices available to the
regulator is then d 0 (0, 1, 2).
For each trading program there is an abatement
level, which solves (1a) for ETS-0, ETS-1, and A*
m,




Ri ' ¯ E & A *
m,
and invests in monitoring devices (d) to maximize
expected social welfare. Given d, m, and behavioral
assumptions, the expected ex post abatement levels
will be  The costs and benefits will be  ) Adm O . C(Adm O
and  respectively. If the regulator has an B(Adm O ),
exogenous budget ($B) to spend on monitoring, the
regulator’s problem is RP
1:





B(Adm O ) & C(Adm O ),
s.t.:  (n! j)CC(d) # $B.
For each trading program, the first-order condi-
tions are:






& λ $ 0,





& λ ' 0;
(3b)        $B & (n & j)CC(d *) $ 0,
λ* $B & (n & j)CC(d *) ' 0;
and
(3c)        j
n
i'1
aiO ' Adm O .
Here, λ can be interpreted as the shadow value of in-
creasing the budget to allow increasing investments
in monitoring efforts. Optimal investment is char-
acterized by equating the marginal net benefits of
increased abatement due to monitoring efforts with
λ. Given the discrete nature of monitoring invest-
ments and relative effects on the cost function, the
optimal choice of   will always be the maximum Adm O
allowable under $B.
Empirically estimating (3) is important in and of
itself. However, the optimization required by the
regulator in this sense has no explicit incentive to
weigh the marginal welfare gains from increasing
investments in monitoring efforts. By endogeniz-
ing the budget, it is possible to better illustrate
the tradeoffs between social welfare and environ-
mental quality (Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 1998;
Farzin and Kaplan, 1999; Stranlund and Dhanda,
1999).
Therefore, suppose the regulator now levies a
lump-sum tax (T) on the (n ! j) nonpoint sources to
7  The regulator has observed (via surveys or direct observation) farm
choices of r and z in the past, and has mapped discharge levels and profits
as a function of weather, soil characteristics, r, and z using a biophysical
soils model. Furthermore, given observable data (i.e., weather and soil
characteristics) and correctly reported data (i.e., r and z), the regulator can
accurately estimate how much phosphorus is discharged from nonpoint
sources. As mentioned, the regulator can readily observe actual r-abate-
ment efforts. The only parameters the regulator cannot observe are the
farm choices of z.
8  Assume that control costs are not a function of abatement levels, but
are simply fixed costs required each year to monitor the relevant NPS
management practice (e.g., the purchase of LandSat imagery of the region
to determine timing or type of tillage practice).Johansson Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information   225
pay for monitoring devices.
9 Such a tax might
resemble a per acre fee assessed by a monitoring
agency to pay for farm visits or to purchase water
quality kits.
10 The regulator facing an endogenous
budget constraint will solve RP
2:





B(Adm O ) & C(Adm O ) & (n & j)T,
      s.t.:  (n! j)CC(d) # (n! j)T.
For each trading program, the first-order condi-
tions are:






& λ $ 0,





& λ ' 0;
(4b)    (n & j)T & (n & j)CC(d) $ 0,
λ* (n & j)T & (n & j)CC(d) ' 0;
and
(4c)     j
n
i'1
aiO ' Adm O .
The regulator will levy taxes to purchase monitor-
ing equipment such that the net benefits including
the costs of monitoring are maximized. Specifically,
the regulator will invest in monitoring devices so
long as the gains in social welfare achievable under
the monitored regime exceed the cost of purchasing
the devices.
Empirical Application
To illustrate the changes in social welfare across
policies, this analysis utilizes data gathered from
the Sand Creek watershed of the Lower Minnesota
Basin. The Lower Minnesota is the largest source
of the 1,000+ tons of phosphorus deposited by the
Minnesota River (Faeth, 2000; Mulla, 1998) into
the Mississippi River. The Sand Creek is one of the
largest sub-basins in the Lower Minnesota, draining
148,394 acres of agricultural land and contributing
on average 115,000 pounds/year of phosphorus to
the Minnesota River (Johansson, 2000). These are
substantial and important quantities, particularly
since the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MPCA) has targeted the Minnesota River for more
than a 40% reduction in aggregate phosphorus dis-
charges (MPCA, 1999).
Nonpoint Source Abatement Costs
Following Montgomery’s (1972) general framework,
the abatement cost function maps the cost-mini-
mizing choice of abatement effort for each NPS
necessary to achieve any desired abatement level.
The restricted profits and phosphorus discharge
values needed to estimate these abatement cost
functions were simulated using the Agricultural
Drainage and Pesticide Transport (ADAPT) model.
ADAPT is a field-scale, water table management
model, which estimates nutrient and pesticide loads
in addition to crop yields (Chung, Ward, and Schalk,
1992). This model was selected because it has the
ability to account for major surface and subsurface
hydrologic processes including agricultural subsur-
face tile drainage systems, useful for the tile-drained
soils of the Upper Midwest.
The watershed modeling approach used to predict
nutrient discharges and crop yields was developed
by Gowda et al. (1999). This approach uses geo-
graphically referenced data to separate the region
into distinct representative farm areas. These data
layers include land uses, slopes, tillage practices,
soil groups, and distance to water channel. These
distinct farm areas, termed Transformed Hydrologic
Response Units (THRUs), can be thought of as the
n ! j nonpoint sources on a per acre basis corres-
ponding to the 148,394 acres in the watershed.
THRUs are used with the watershed model ADAPT
to simulate crop yields and nutrient movement in the
watershed as a function of crop, tillage, and ferti-
lizer management practices.
To estimate the NPS cost functions, ordinary least
squares (OLS) was used first to map abatement costs
to abatement levels and to identify the appropriate
functional form of the cost function. However,
because OLS estimations minimize the squared
deviation of observations from the fit of the abate-
ment cost function, it may be biased upward due to
redundant combinations of intensive and extensive
9  Note that this tax is not an effluent fee or a penalty per se designed
explicitly as a disincentive to pollute (Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 1998;
Smith and Tomasi, 1999). Rather, this tax is used to invest in monitoring
efforts, which will reveal farmers’ adoption of unobservable abatement
practices. For the purposes of exposition, the penalty for noncompliance
is assumed to be sufficiently high to induce truth telling.
10  The lump-sum tax is assumed to be small enough that it does not
affect the firm’s entry or exit decisions, and therefore the per acre repre-
sentation is used to illustrate how potential ranges of monitoring costs
might affect the regulator’s monitoring investment and program deci-
sions. The per acre fee could also be levied on point sources; under many
EPA point-nonpoint source offset programs, it is the point source that is
responsible for the monitoring costs to ensure the offset contract is being
met (Ross and Associates Consulting, 2000).226   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1.  Abatement Costs for Sand Creek Point and Nonpoint Sources
POINT SOURCES
 a Discharge (lbs./year)   No. Operations   Abatement Cost R
2
WWTF-J 2,285 1 0.033166(a)
2       0.94
WWTF-N 8,445 1 0.004903(a)
2       0.92
Feedlots 29,180 92 0.839657(a)
2       0.81
NONPOINT SOURCES
 b Discharge (lbs./year)   Acres   Abatement Cost R
2
MN079A (> 300') 20,161 59,014 136.56(a)
2 0.63
MN080A (> 300') 4,777 11,673 230.90(a)
2 0.70
MN081A (> 300') 3,452 8,476 87.73(a)
2 0.63
MN163A (> 300') 2,180 8,300 350.76(a)
2 0.56
MN165A (> 300') 3,070 2,525 14.85(a)
2 0.89
MN169A (> 300')
 c 1,685 1,433 !2.69(a)
2 0.03
MN171A (> 300') 243 508 155.69(a)
2 0.66
MN178A (> 300') 155 549 593.47(a)
2 0.96
MN196A (> 300') 16,648 34,953 131.74(a)
2 0.74
MN079B (< 300') 8,188 9,219 20.20(a)
2 0.63
MN080B (< 300') 1,922 1,806 34.16(a)
2 0.70
MN081B (< 300') 1,453 1,373 12.98(a)
2 0.63
MN163B (< 300') 1,317 1,928 51.89(a)
2 0.56
MN165B (< 300') 1,579 499 2.20(a)
2 0.89
MN169B (< 300')
 c 1,118 366 !0.40(a)
2 0.03
MN171B (< 300') 41 33 23.03(a)
2 0.66
MN178B (< 300') 54 73 87.97(a)
2 0.96




2 values conform to OLS estimates of quadratic abatement costs. For nonpoint source estimates, the R
2s conform to the
initial OLS estimation of functional form. The abatement cost functions reported conform to the second-stage frontier estimation.
a WWTF-J and WWTF-N are wastewater treatment facilities in Jordan and New Prague, respectively.
b Nonpoint sources are distinguished by Minnesota soil association (MN----) and distance to a water transport channel corresponding to
Transformed Hydrologic Response Units (THRUs) (Gowda et al., 1999; Sharpley et al., 1999).
c The nonpoint source abatement cost functions are estimated over the intensive management margin. In certain instances over this range,
the estimation indicates that the constrained profit exceeds the unconstrained profit (i.e., negative abatement costs). This phenomenon is
reflected in actuality via the adoption of conservation tillage regimes (Conservation Technology Information Center, 1998), but does revert
to the expected convex form when extensive management practices are necessary for high levels of abatement.
abatement efforts used in the simulations. These
redundancies arise from topographical features
and may not be consistent with cost-minimizing
behavior. Therefore, frontier analysis was used to
estimate the actual cost function (Battese, 1992;
Coelli, 1995; Johansson, 2000). The convex frontier
will represent the cost-minimizing shell of all best
management practices (table 1).
11
Point Source Abatement Costs
The main point source contributors of phosphorus
to the Sand Creek are the wastewater treatment
facilities in Jordan and New Prague (WWTF-J and
WWTF-N) and 92 feedlots. Using observations
from 10 comparable wastewater facilities (Senjem,
1997) having different flow rates and influent con-
centrations, the marginal effects of these variables
on average abatement costs were first estimated
using OLS. These estimates were then used to con-
struct abatement cost functions for WWTF-J and
WWTF-N, given the flow rates and influent concen-
trations at those facilities (table 1).
To estimate abatement costs for the feedlots, it
was necessary to compare livestock producers’ will-
ingness to accept contracts for abatement of manure
nutrients in this region (Tiffany, 1999). Under this
11  A simple quadratic function describing the convex relationship be-
tween abatement levels and costs is justified with the exception of two
nonpoint sources: MN169A and MN169B. These correspond to margin-
ally productive soils and account for only 2.4% of the aggregate phos-
phorus discharge. As noted by an anonymous reviewer, because these
soils have negative abatement costs, they will manifest in excessive
abatement if there is a market for permit sales. However, these functions
conform to convexity at high levels of abatement effort (Johansson, 2000).
Consequently, these sources will immediately adopt abatement efforts
that yield positive returns (e.g., conservation tillage), but will weigh
further efforts that are costly (i.e., once the cost curve becomes convex)
























program, livestock producers applied for financial
assistance when adopting better phosphorus man-
agement practices requiring a detailed explanation
of costs and benefits resulting from the adoption of
these practices (figure 1). Using OLS, the costs of
reducing the discharge of phosphorus into surround-
ing waters was estimated for a representative feed-
lot (table 1).
Aggregate Abatement
To estimate the aggregate abatement costs and ben-
efits for the Sand Creek watershed for the trading
programs, several assumptions were necessary.
Using the individual abatement cost functions, the
aggregate costs for different levels of abatement
were simulated for the three trading programs
(ETS-2, ETS-1, and ETS-0) assuming full-informa-
tion. The resulting costs for each program were used
to estimate an aggregate cost function. As expected,
when nonpoint sources are allowed to base trades on
the complete set of management practices, aggregate
costs are lower than those for the more restrictive
trading programs (table 2).
To calculate social welfare (SW) under these
policies, an estimate of the marginal benefit func-
tion for phosphorus abatement in the Sand Creek
was required. Combining revealed and stated
preferences, Mathews, Homans, and Easter (1999)
estimate a random-effects probit model for phos-
phorus abatement in the Minnesota River similar to
a model developed by Loomis (1997). This study
allows an estimation of the marginal effects of water
quality on the willingness to pay for phosphorus
abatement calibrated to the Sand Creek region. This
estimate requires that marginal willingness to pay
approaches zero as abatement approaches 100%—
i.e., the benefits to abatement level off as total abate-
ment is realized, consistent with traditional assump-
tions of benefits functions. Given this assumption
and the relevant literature (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980), the form of the inverse demand function for
phosphorus abatement is assumed to be semi-log
(table 2).
Results
To generate the potential for noncompliance on the
unobservable margin, the efficient level of abate-
ment given the permit constraint was first estimated
for each PS and NPS. All possible combinations of
r and z yielding the same level of abatement were
then generated for the NPSs. The cost-minimizing
levels of observable and unobservable abatement
choices were selected for analysis given the rela-
tionship C(ai(riN, ziN)) $ C(ai(r *
i , z *
i )) $ C(ai(aiO,0 ) )
œ i = j + 1, ..., n.
Evaluating the first-order conditions, (4a)S(4c),
for all m 0 (0, 1, 2), it is possible to derive solutions
to RP
2 given the costs of investing in monitoring
  Source: Johansson (2000).
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Table 2.  Aggregate Costs and Benefits of Abatement for Trading Programs
Trading Program Aggregate Costs Aggregate Benefits
         ETS-2 C(AN) = 0.000441(AN) B(A) = 635.2024(A) ! 50.2024(A × ln(A))
         ETS-1 C(AN) = 0.000461(AN) B(A) = 635.2024(A) ! 50.2024(A × ln(A))
         ETS-0 C(AN) = 0.001242(AN) B(A) = 635.2024(A) ! 50.2024(A × ln(A))
Sources: Mathews, Homans, and Easter (2000); Johansson (2000).
Table 3.  Abatement and Social Welfare for Monitoring and Trading Programs
Trading Program Device  Abatement
 a Social Welfare






         $3,500,029 ! (148,394 × CC(2))
         $3,154,926 ! (148,394 × CC(1))
         $3,079,450




         $3,453,394 ! (148,394 × CC(1))
         $3,083,220
         ETS-0 0 28,323          $2,418,186
a Abatement levels correspond to the expected level of aggregate abatement given the regulator’s choice of [d, m] and source choice of
actual abatement given the presence of moral hazard.
Table 4.  Effects of Monitoring Costs on Social Welfare
Monitoring Costs ($/acre) Device Trading Program Social Welfare, SW(Adm O ) 
$2.83 > CC(1) + $0.31 > CC(2) 2 ETS-2 SW(A22 O) = $3,500,029 ! (148,394 × CC(2))
$2.49 > CC(2) + $0.31 > CC(1) 1 ETS-1 SW(A11 O) = $3,453,394 ! (148,394 × CC(1))
CC(1) $ $2.49 0 ETS-1 SW(A01 O) = $3,083,220
devices (table 3). It is apparent that with perfect in-
formation, the regulator would allow the full range
of abatement activities and would distribute approx-
imately 66,000 permits to generate $3.5 million in
social welfare. However, under asymmetric infor-
mation and an endogenous budget constraint, the
optimal selection of m and d will depend on the
costs of investing in monitoring devices. Following
from (4), the regulator will invest in monitoring
devices so long as the increased benefits from the
additional abatement exceed the increased abate-
ment and investment costs.
The effect of investment costs on the optimal
selection of m and d is reported in table 4 for ranges
of monitoring costs. Treating each acre of agricul-
tural land as a nonpoint source, it can be seen from
table 4 that if the cost to monitor fertilizer applica-
tion methods exceeds $2.49 per acre (i.e., $370,174
÷ 148,394 acres), then the regulator will employ the
restricted trading program (ETS-1) with no invest-
ments in monitoring. Similarly, if the cost to monitor
both application rates and methods is less than
$2.83 per acre [i.e., ($3,500,029 ! $3,079,450) ÷
148,394 acres] and is marginally less expensive
than the cost to only monitor application methods,
then the regulator will invest in both monitoring
devices and employ the most flexible trading pro-
gram (ETS-2). Under no circumstances will the reg-
ulator choose the most restrictive trading program
(ETS-0).
Potential Monitoring Costs
To compare possible monitoring costs for agri-
cultural nonpoint pollution, 14 current national
monitoring programs (U.S. EPA, 2001b) were eval-
uated. Monitoring efforts vary greatly among these
programs. The majority of the watersheds employ
water quality monitoring along the affected river to
control for up- and downstream effects. The water-
sheds are also separated into treatment and control
regions to measure the impact of BMP implemen-
tation, including different fertilizer application rate
and method regimes.
The intensity of these monitoring programs
can be broadly separated into two categories: lowJohansson Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information   229






Bad River, SD 16,728 2,053,760 0.01
Waukegan River, Il 1,441 7,640 0.19
Elm Creek, NE 18,125 35,800 0.51
Sycamore Creek, MI 84,500 67,740 1.25
Swatara Creek, PA 35,000 27,520 1.27
Morro Bay Watershed, CA 62,000 48,450 1.28
Totten and Eld Inlet, WA 94,167 67,200 1.40
Potential Sand Creek 1 222,600 148,400  1.50 ²
Long Creek, NC 71,648 28,480 2.52
Otter Creek, WI 25,000 7,040 3.55
Lightwood Knot Creek, AL 181,429 47,300 3.84
Potential Sand Creek 2 593,600 148,400  4.00 ²
Walnut Creek, IA 110,100 24,570 4.48
Sny Magill Watershed, IA 111,116 22,780 4.88
Lake Pittsfield, IL 88,540 7,000 12.65
Lake Champlain Basin, VT 109,718 7,576 14.48
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001b).
Table 6.  Policy Comparisons: ETS Trading Programs vs. Uniform Abatement Policies
Policy Comparison Policy Comparison
Description ETS-2-2   Uniform-2   ETS-1-1  Uniform-1  
Aggregate Measures:
  Abatement (pounds) 48,800 48,800 47,804 47,804
  Monitoring Costs ($) 593,600 593,600 222,600 222,600
  Abatement Costs ($) 1,050,215 2,093,754 1,053,488 2,001,089
  Benefits ($) 4,550,244 4,550,244 4,506,882 4,506,882
  Welfare ($) 2,906,429 1,862,870 3,230,794 2,283,193
  (Full Information) ($) (3,500,029) (2,456,470) (3,453,394) (2,505,793)
Average Cropland Measures (per acre):
  Abatement (pounds) 0.268  0.215   0.259 0.210
  Monitoring Costs ($) 4.00 4.00   1.50   1.50
  Abatement Costs ($) 5.12 4.03   4.89   3.86
  Permit Price ($) 43.04   — 44.08   —
  Permit Revenue ($) 2.32 —   2.15   —
  Net Cost per Acre ($) 6.80 8.03   4.24   5.36
  (Full Information) ($) (2.80) (4.03)   (2.74)   (3.86)
Notes: ETS-2-2 is the first-best trading program and ETS-1-1 is the second-best trading program, under asymmetric information.
Uniform-2 and Uniform-1 are the respective uniform abatement policy counterparts (i.e., conventional policies requiring uniform phos-
phorus abatement across all sources given the same levels of aggregate abatement).
intensity and high intensity (table 5). Choosing
representative values of $1.50 per acre per year and
$4.00 per acre per year, respectively, for these two
categories, suppose that these approximate CC(1)
and CC(2). While these programs do not expressly
monitor fertilizer rates and machinery on all farms,
the costs for the Sand Creek would correspond to
$222,600 per year and $593,600 per year, which
would be upper bounds for conventional monitor-
ing costs compared to other watersheds of this size.
The differences between the first- and second-
best policies are summarized in table 6. The230   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
solution to the endogenous budget, social welfare
maximization problem is to employ ETS-1 and to
invest in monitoring costs of $1.50 per acre to
reveal fertilizer application methods:  = SW(A11 O )
$3,230,794. Here, the second-best policy (ETS-1)
outperforms the first-best policy (ETS-2) by approx-
imately 11%. Under full information, the first-best
mechanism is marginally more efficient than the
second-best mechanism, by 1.3%. As a point of
reference, the two trading policies are compared to
conventional policies requiring uniform phosphorus
abatement (Uniform) across all sources given the
same levels of aggregate abatement. In both cases,
the investment in monitoring equipment is assumed
to be the same as with tradable permits.
From table 6, it can be seen that trading programs
significantly outperform the uniform reduction
policies. The first-best trading program (ETS-2-2)
outperforms its uniform reduction counterpart
(Uniform-2) by 36%. The second-best trading pro-
gram (ETS-1-1) outperforms its uniform reduction
counterpart (Uniform-1) by 29%. Note these prefer-
ences would change given an exogenous budget
greater than $593,600. In such a case, the regulator
would choose the first-best trading program result-
ing in  = $3,500,029. SW(A22 O )
The treatment of agricultural producers under the
two tradable permit mechanisms and the uniform
abatement policies is important to disentangle from
the results. Under the most flexible trading program
(ETS-2), agricultural producers abate more phos-
phorus and sell more permits than under the more
restrictive program (ETS-1). However, the optimal
level of abatement required to maximize social
welfare is lower under ETS-1 and the equilibrium
permit price is higher (fewer permits and fewer
NPS abatement possibilities). In addition, the per
acre tax imposed on the NPSs to fund monitoring
efforts is less under the more restrictive trading pro-
gram than under the flexible trading program.
Given these three effects, the cost to comply with
a phosphorus abatement policy is less for agricul-
tural producers under the second-best trading pro-
gram for both the full- and asymmetric-information
case (table 6). Under both trading programs,
agricultural crop producers incur approximately
80% of the total abatement costs, whereas under the
uniform reduction policies, this percentage falls to
29%. However, revenue earned from trading reduces
overall costs to crop producers, making these
policies more attractive when compared to uniform
reduction policies (i.e., ETS-2-2 is preferred to
Uniform-2; ETS-1-1 is preferred to Uniform-1).
Conclusions
It is clear from the burgeoning literature on NPS
pollution and market-based regulatory policies that
the effects of asymmetric information on NPS regu-
lation are both interesting and important to consider.
This is especially true in light of the increased desire
to include NPS abatement in states’ Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) water quality efforts for nutri-
ents and sediment. Trading programs offer a means
to encourage NPS offsets of PS abatement obliga-
tions under these standards at lower cost to society
(U.S. EPA, 2002).
While many investigations have critiqued such
approaches because of asymmetric information, few
have actually evaluated what  the loss in efficiency
might be due to noncompliance. A simple frame-
work is developed in this study to consider PS and
NPS phosphorus discharges and performance-based
regulation. This framework illustrates how regula-
tory efficiency can be improved by using market
mechanisms to target abatement, and evaluates the
degree to which social welfare may be compro-
mised when NPSs are in noncompliance.
Subject to an endogenous budget constraint and
known costs and benefits of abatement, the dead-
weight losses due to moral hazard and investments
in monitoring equipment are evaluated for Sand
Creek, a small, phosphorus-impaired watershed in
southern Minnesota. Using representative costs from
the EPA’s national water monitoring programs, it is
possible to delineate ranges of costs potentially
needed to monitor phosphorus abatement policies
in this watershed.
Respective per acre costs of $4.00 and $1.50 were
chosen to represent high- and low-intensity mon-
itoring efforts. Given these costs and the desire of
the regulator to maximize social welfare, it is shown
that a restricted trading program (ETS-1) with
monitoring costs of $1.50 per acre to determine
fertilizer application methods resulted in the highest
social welfare ($3,230,794) across the chosen poli-
cies. This was approximately 11% higher than the
first-best policy, which required a greater invest-
ment in monitoring equipment. Both of these
trading programs outperformed by more than 29%
an equivalent policy requiring uniform abatement
across all sources. Finally, agricultural crop produ-
cers would prefer the restricted trading program to
the less restrictive trading program because of de-
creased abatement and increased permit prices.
It should be noted that these results are tempered
by many factors omitted from consideration. ForJohansson Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information   231
example, this analysis has based permit allocations
and trades on expected abatement levels. In such a
case, the trading ratio is assumed to be 1:1 for point
and nonpoint sources, essentially treating nonpoint
sources as a special case of point sources (Xepapa-
deas, 1991). When this trading ratio exceeds parity
to correct for uncertain nonpoint source discharges,
the expected gains to trading will diminish (Malik,
Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993; Hoag and Hughes-
Popp, 1997). The effect of changing trading ratios
on the incentives to misrepresent abatement efforts
is unclear. In addition, the assumptions surrounding
monitoring and enforcement could be relaxed in
future research to include heterogeneous auditing
probabilities, detection probabilities, and enforce-
ment costs.
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